+1,680% In 4 Years!

No, silly. That’s not my performance. I wish.

As my posts get far and infrequent, each would naturally be a mish mash of several stuff that’s unrelated. So, of course, I’d choose the 1 with the most attention grabbing headline. It’s not scammish though… I’m featuring a friend’s performance.

More on that later…


@Homan (From the comments section)

Here’s the screenshot that I couldn’t attach to the comments section then. So I’m attaching them here for you:

892) bynd CALLS.jpg

So yea, pretty far OTM. All obviously expired now. (In fact, I could’ve doubled my premiums earned if I was a tad more adventurous and sold nearer to the money options, but I prefer to sleep better.)

At the point of typing this, the following are the current outstanding options. I’ve rolled over several, and unless a mother-of-all miracle happens, I’d be taking these off the “liabilities” column of my “balance sheet” in a fortnight. There are now considerably less options, cos the lock up expiry is fast approaching, and the markets know what I know, so yea, the premiums aren’t fantastic, and I’m not that keen on picking up tiny pennies, so it’s a no-go if the premiums aren’t worth the risk. (Although at this point, I think the risk is pretty negligible). Anyhow, my thesis in BYND has played out beautifully, and provided a nice fat cashflow every week for the past 8 weeks or so.

893) BYND oct12.jpg


2019 YTD Performance

Hmmm, I’m kinda in 2 minds about whether to write about this, since the last report was only a mth ago (To Infinity & Beyond? Nah!) and I don’t really like to spend so much time tracking. But since IB does up all these reports nicely, so I’d just mostly cut and paste here.

SG Markets

Total portfolio value in SG markets is SGD 243,092

Comprising mostly stakes in Dutech, Q&M and Venture Corp, I haven’t done any work here aside from some cursory tracking.

Bonds

Again, nothing much to talk about here, the bond portfolio is approximately SGD 550,000.  It’d be another 1-2 yrs before the fruits ripen here. I’m possibly being too conservative here, and this portion might balloon when they are due in a couple of years, depending on the market conditions.

US / Global Markets

894) IB ROI.jpg

I wouldn’t mind ending 2019 with a 34.95% return.

(Assuming S&P stays at a +20% return, thereabouts)

NAV dipped a little since the last report (To Infinity & Beyond? Nah!) cos I withdrew a lump sum of $50k SGD to stuff into my property fund. I’ve been doing lots of work here, and feel that I can now be a better property agent than most other agents out there. LOL. Maybe I’d write about it in another post.

Using USD-SGD of 1.37, total portfolio value is now SGD 2,196,369

That’s a slight dip from the last report 1mth ago, mostly due to the cash withdrawal of about $50k SGD, which I’ve taken out of the investing portfolio and channeled into the property fund instead.

Global portfolio portion is pretty much the same as last month, nothing too much has changed. Trade wars on, trade wars off, whatever. Doesn’t quite affect what I do too much actually. More volatility is good for me actually, IMO. If there’s no volatility, that means there’s no uncertainty, and if there’s no uncertainty, that means there’s little mispricing to take advantage of.

HKEx listed Future Land, which has since become 1 of my core positions, has been recovering steadily:

895) Future Land.jpg

Since the last post, I’ve gone into tracking their various land banks and developments, some partially completed, some ready for sale. This is no mean feat as there are like 27 PAGES worth of listed projects at various stages within its AR!

I’ve zoomed into those that are partially or wholly in the sale phases, the main reason being that I’m concerned about being blindsided by any sudden write downs in valuation.

Now, although Future Land is HK listed, it has ZERO holdings or developments in HK. Most of their projects are in the tier 2 or tier 3 cities in China. As of now, most of the completed projects are in Chong qing. I’m confident that if anything, there should be revaluation GAINS instead, as Chong qing’s residential index has risen substantially when comparing y-o-y, esp in the 1H of 2019. Since June though, the market has cooled considerably, as the local governments are mandated to tame runaway prices and new local measures have been put in place.

Some substantiation here on Chong qing’s residential property prices:

https://www.scmp.com/property/hong-kong-china/article/3005212/home-sales-rise-643-cent-chongqing-barometer-chinas

(Note that the article is written in April this year)

https://www.ceicdata.com/en/china/nbs-property-price-monthly/property-price-ytd-avg-chongqing

Although we are talking about non-cash items here, I think in the short to mid term, the earnings will drive the news and the share price, so it’s key that I don’t get caught out by suddenly revaluation changes. (unless they are positive ones!)

Although my estimate is up 17% currently, I’m still looking to add to my substantial stake on any dips. This may not happen though, as the markets are probably going to react positively to the Trump partial trade deal on Monday, so prices may run away. Anyway, my current stake is enough to move the needle.

On a different note, I’ve sometimes been asked about the specific “inefficiencies” in the options markets. I’ve screenshotted 1 a couple of weeks ago, so let me illustrate a very simple to understand, straightforward example here. It’s a very simplistic example, and in all likelihood, there are other factors at play, but yea, this should be easy for readers to comprehend:

896) STMP options inefficiency.jpg

This is the options chain for STMP a couple of weeks back. (in which I hold a moderate position, and have previously put up an estimate for)

903) STMP.jpg

At the time of the screenshot, the share price was around $73.8 or so, as we can see in the chain.

The further out the calls (calls with strike prices further from the current share price then), would in theory, be less likely to be exercised than the nearer calls, and hence, should IN THEORY, command a lower premium right?

Yet as we can see in the option chain above, the bid prices for the $76.50 option are much HIGHER than the other options below them (the $76, $75.5, $75 etc)…

If we examine further down the option chain, at various intervals, there are sometimes higher bid prices for further out options, and correspondingly, narrower spreads.

They’re mostly just a reflection of the demand for these option contracts at these strike prices. Simple as that. It may not necessarily be logical.

I’ve also observed on several occasions, that options with strike prices that are whole numbers, tend to have greater liquidity than those with odd numbers or not whole ones. Like for eg, $80 contracts would be more “popular” than say, $81.50.

Which doesn’t make sense mathematically to a robot, but we are humans and humans have a preference for nice round numbers yea?

So there we go. That’s inefficiency right there, as a result of human bias and preferences.

Real Estate

Looking back at some old posts, I’ve been accumulating a property fund for over 2 years now.

TTI’s Portfolio Updates – End July 2019 + The Thanos Of Global Macro Funds Is Coming Back!

TTI’s Portfolio Performance – May 2019 + Avenue Therapeutics Updates

Right now, the property fund has about SGD 600,000 worth of liquidity. 

Which I realize, isn’t too much more than what I had in the fund back in May 2019.

So somewhere along the lines, I took out some funds, probably to invest in the US markets. Which is why now, I took out some funds and re-inflated the property fund back to around $600k.

Despite hunting for deals for over 2 years, they are really hard to come by. The 1 time I came across a REAL firesale deal, it got snapped up within a week and I failed to capitalize cos of a lack of liquidity.

If there’s a real firesale, you can’t then go to the bank to get pre-approval and all that. Speed and financial firepower are of essence. These are the real deals that I’m looking for, and I’m incredibly patient here.

At various points, I’ve been tempted, and still am, to put this $600k ++ to work harder in the financial markets. Imagine giving up a simple 5% additional yield on this $600k… That’s an additional $30k every year.

Not a game changing number, but not really negligible either.

Yet, I prefer to forego this, and keep my gunpowder dry, cos of my previous experience (I prob wrote about it somewhere in a long forgotten post)

Most of the property fund is kept in FSMOne’s MMF, which gives me a low-no risk kinda return. I don’t know how much. Probably around 1-1.5% I think.

I used to just keep everything in my UOB account, but the large number attracts “relationship managers” who keep cold calling me, and it’s super irritating. UOB’s RMs have a high attrition rate, and I get a letter followed by a determined caller every few months, often asking to “catch up over coffee” so that they can “serve my needs” and you know, all that lingo.

Truth is… I’ve only really needed their services ONCE.

And they didn’t come through for me.

Yep, once, for the very 1st time, I gave my faceless RM a call. I remember clearly, it’s right after meeting CEO Tung of Geo Energy. I called my RM while sitting in my car cos I was just so excited about spotting a good opportunity.

Their Jan 2018 maturing notes were trading at a crazy YTM yield then, and I could’ve easily raked in a 60% ROI for a BBB rated bond that was maturing within less than a year! (Edit: an earlier post erroneously wrote that the bonds were maturing in Jan 2019)

After talking to Tung, I realized that there’s certainly mispricing here cos the company certainly had enough funds to redeem the notes. When 1 of the company’s own directors bought 1 (or was it 2?) of the bonds (they were $250k per pop), I figured that it’s pretty safe. I mean, surely the director isn’t going to throw away $250k of his own money if he wasn’t sure the company could redeem them in 9 months.

I asked Tung why didn’t the company buy back their own bonds then, since they were about to mature within less than a year, and were trading at such a deep discount. His reply was that they couldn’t buy it efficiently in the open market. There was too little liquidity, and nobody was selling. I checked, and true enough, nobody’s selling on the bond markets.

To illustrate his point, Tung pointed to a lady in a bright red dress, who was seated just beside us as we were chatting, and said “why don’t u ask her if she wants to sell? She’s holding a lot of the bonds!”

And the lady just looked at us and smiled dryly without saying a word.

But since their own director could buy 1 of the bonds on the open market, and since UOB was the underwriter for the bonds then, I thought to ask my RM if he could help me or at least refer me to someone who could sell me 1.

The phone call lasted all of 3 mins.

When the RM realized that I’m not asking about some financial product that he could sell me, man, the cursory tone was emanating across the call. He just wasn’t interested to even continue the conversation. He wasn’t even interested to TRY.

“This 1 ah, I not sure. You ask your broker better la ok.”

So there.

So much for “finding out how he could be of service over coffee”.

I don’t know what’s the use of a “premium account” with UOB. I didn’t ask for it. They just upgraded my account automatically when they realized there’s a high 6 digits sitting in it doing nothing for years, and not buying their financial products.

As I’ve found out, I certainly don’t need the “personalized relationship manager”, and since I hardly physically go to the bank, I don’t need a priority queue either.

It’s probably just for them to classify and figure out who amongst their clients, are best targets to push more products to.


Alright, let me get to the main course now.

Some weeks back, I received an email from a fellow investor that I’ve on occasion, spoken to on an investing public forum:

897) vincent wong email.jpg

I readily agreed to meet up (and it’s not often that I do), cos Vincent’s quite an interesting character with 1 helluva track record (that’s verifiable. Not some junk make believe, con job return that anyone online can generate)

Here, check out Vincent’s track record:

YTD:

899) vincent wong YTD.png

Since inception (I dunno when that is, I think sometime in 2016):

898 )vincent wong returns

Normally, I’d view someone hawking such figures, with a healthy dose of skepticism.

But Vincent readily discusses his ideas, and posts about his positions in real time. (or almost real time.)

Plus it’s not just about posting about entries and exits or whatever.

It’s the strength of his ideas.

And I’ve a hack of an ability to sieve out the real masters from the fake dudes.

We met up and spent almost 5 hours discussing both our positions and ideas, until I had to excuse myself abruptly as I was very much late for another appointment.

I’d say the best way to describe his style, is that of the old school value investing, but with a very heavy touch of realism and practicality. Throw in a big chunk of industry knowledge and qualitative analysis to the usual quantitative touches.

In that aspect, we have quite a fair bit of similarities here. Main difference being that Vincent is 100% in the HK and Chinese markets only, whereas I’m mostly in the US markets.

This doesn’t mean that we see eye to eye on everything.

For example, Vincent told me straight up, no holds barred, that he wouldn’t short BYND. But even then, the reason he gave is really unique, and this is the 1st time I’m hearing someone describe it as such.

Vincent thinks that there are now many rich family offices and part of their mandate is to allocate funds into companies that have a “social impact”. And since there are very few companies that can fulfil this criteria, there’d always be excessive funds looking to park themselves into such companies. Like BYND. Supply and demand.

I’ve never heard of such a reason given with regard to BYND. But yea, it perfectly illustrates what I mean.

Value investing, but with a healthy touch of realism and practicality. 

I wouldn’t say I totally disagree with him, which is why my options have a wide moat, instead of trying to sell close to the money options, but my reasons are certainly different from his.

At least we both can agree that there’re no fundamentals to talk about here.

Looking at the performance the past 2 months, and esp the past week though, I’d have to claim victory here. hahaha! yay.

I’d add a disclaimer here. Although Vincent knows beforehand that I’d be writing about him in this post, he has no idea as to what are the contents, and neither am I running the content through him prior to publishing this. Read: This is my honest, un-edited opinion. (yes, of course I gotta ask for permission to talk about our discussion first. It’s basic courtesy.)

We also discussed, at length and in detail, about Ping An Good Doctor, and Vincent’s ideas are pretty interesting. They mostly focus around finding industry leaders (quality companies), for which, he is willing to pay a reasonable price, or even a slight premium.

Since our discussion a mere week or so ago, Ping An GD’s share price has popped over 10% or so, and unfortunately, neither of us initiated a position.

Good ideas will always exist though, so I’m excited to see what other stuff he has up his sleeve.

Vincent is currently working as a cook (Yes. A cook.), while studying accounting part-time. I’ve blocked out his email address above, but anyone who wants to have it, can either drop me a mail directly, or ask him yourself if you are on InvestingNote.

I’d end this post by giving Vincent some coverage here.

This is an old post that he wrote, that I really liked a lot. Prob the best investing philosophy stuff I’ve read in IN.

I don’t know if he plagiarized it from elsewhere or he came up with it himself, but personally, I think there’s a lot of insights to be gleaned from every line.

The fact that it has “14 likes” whereas some other useless junk stuff talking about nonsense lines and intersections or counterparty stuff can have like a 100 likes tells me I’m in rarified company.

Which is a good thing.

For me, that is.

898) vincent wong 1.jpg

899) vincent wong 2.jpg

900) vincent wong 3.jpg

901) vincent wong 4.jpg

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To Infinity & Beyond? Nah!

Happy Mid Autumn Festival Guys!

879) Mid Autumn Festival

I’ve come to realize that since my investing thesis on Avenue Therapeutics (Avenue Therapeutics – No Pain, Lots Of Gain?), I suddenly have a band of American readers/fellow investors/subscribers.

Apparently, a friend highlighted to me that if you google Avenue Therapeutics, SG TTI’s post on the company is in the 4th link (thereabouts).

Since then, I’ve had a few emails from global readers. This is interesting to me as it’s a fresh and different perspective. Plus I think, most local investors don’t actually understand the thesis that much.

So… to the global readers who would probably not be aware… Mid Autumn Festival is today (13th Sept 2019) and this is a festival whereby folks like myself eat mooncakes and drink tea and supposedly, have to admire the full moon.

Well, skip the full moon part. But I do enjoy mooncakes. They’re absolutely delicious. If you haven’t tried them before, you should.

But try the SG version ones.

I’ve a buddy who’s mainland Chinese (富二代la), and this year, he sent me a box of mooncakes all the way from Beijing. I’ve gotta say, they taste….. weird. It’s just… too different for my liking.


It’s been over a month since my last post:

TTI’s Portfolio Updates – End July 2019 + The Thanos Of Global Macro Funds Is Coming Back!

So let me start with the usual portfolio performance updates.

SG Markets

Total portfolio value in SG markets is SGD 259,582.

Thus far in 2019 (and we’re already 3/4 of the way through the year), I’ve had zero additions in SG, and instead, fully executed on my plan to pare down stakes, take profit or recognize losses in certain holdings and my current SG holdings are a mere fraction of the overall portfolio. Nothing much has changed, and I intend to continue either holding or paring down stakes if the opportunity arises.

Bonds

Nothing much to talk about here, the bond portfolio is approximately SGD 550,000.  It’d be another 1-2 yrs before the fruits ripen here. I’ve already mentally locked away this capital.

US / Global Markets

This is where I’ve focused much of my energy and attention on.

Having endured a somewhat rough July & August, the past couple of weeks has been absolutely sweet.

Stats from Interactive Brokers:

878) TTI returns Sept 2019.jpg

US/Global Portfolio NAV has grown to USD 1,068,901.11

But check out the blue line above!

It’s *almost vertical in the past 2 weeks!

Of course, global markets have been really on a tear in the past several weeks, but TTI’s gains have far outstripped the indices in the past fortnight.

This can be attributed to sizable gains in a few larger, core positions such as Centurylink (CTL), Broadcom (AVGO), Chesapeake Energy (CHK) & a significant drop in Beyond Meat (BYND), in which, I have a fairly large short position in the form of naked calls sold.

I’ve also built up a core, 6 digits worth of exposure to HK listed Future Land (1030), that has finally started moving. (In the desired direction of course!).

I put in an estimate in IN, and briefly wrote my thoughts then:

882) Futureland.jpg


Assuming USD-SGD of 1.37280, overall portfolio NAV is thus now SGD 2,276,969.

US/Global portfolio has returned 36.75% YTD, which is a significant bump up from my last update (TTI’s Portfolio Updates – End July 2019 + The Thanos Of Global Macro Funds Is Coming Back!) of 28.07%

My approach has always been pretty much bottom-up, company specific.

Yet, once in a while, I try to take a step back and look at the big picture, just to have a sense of where we are currently.

And lo and behold…… having done so recently, I find it pretty amazing that despite everything in the news, Trump’s resolve to single handedly upend decades of conventional trading conditions, all the talk of China’s shadow banking debt, the Hong Kong unrest, and even the now, almost sidelined poor Kim and his nukes, the S&P 500 is actually sitting right now, just a tad below it’s all time highs!

I mean, really, check this out. This is what S&P index looks like YTD:

880) S&P index.jpg

That’s a freaking 20.31% return YTD!

This means that if you’re sitting on say, 18% returns currently, it’d be a winner in most years, but in 2019, it’d be considered a pretty poor performance.

I think a lot of local SG investors fail to consider this.

Really.

Most don’t.

Maybe cos it’s painful to admit that a simple, idiot proof S&P index like SPY is whacking you.

But there’s also a pretty solid argument for using the perennially underperforming  STI ETF as a benchmark instead. If you’re an average retail investor, you’d feel more comfortable staying in SG shores, no forex risks, easier to understand the companies, no geographic risk etc. Sure. I get that.

US/Global exchanges are also where many landmines exist IMO. I watched happily as CHK rose almost 20% in a single night sometime last week… but there were days where it fell like 10%++ in a single night as well. It’s stuff that just doesn’t happen in SGX, at least not for a non-penny stock.

If the YTD chart didn’t look impressive enough, check out how it looks like when we zoom out:

881) S&P

After all’s been said and done, we are really still snapping at the all time highs. It’s pretty amazing.

The flood of monies entering passive instruments like SPY (S&P 500 ETF that I use as a benchmark now. I’m trying to mix it up with the big boys eh.), does mean that we have to be cautious here. Michael Burry recently proclaimed that there’s now a bubble in these passive instruments. How so?

Basically some of the smaller constituents of the ETF may have low liquidity, without much investor attention to these companies. Because of the wide spreads, you can also sometimes see large price volatility.

Yet, because of the flood of monies into passive instruments, these low liquidity companies that by themselves, account for a tiny proportion of the index itself, are now suddenly accounting for the fortunes of a large amount of liquidity.

It’s kinda like a leveraging up process. Suddenly now, any volatility in these small constituents, may end up affecting the value (I say value, but it’s really just the prices), of these ETFs that’s tagged to this index.

Yet, this can go on and on and on and on for god knows how long. Personally, I suspect we are along way from this bubble bursting, i.e. there’s much more inflating to go. Simply cos, there are actually people talking about passive instruments as a bubble. We need to wait till it gets so crazy that folks like u and me, are tempted to throw everything into SPY.

That’s when it bursts.

LOL.

Which leads me to another bubble that’s probably going to burst sooner.

BEYOND MEAT.

Now, as the title suggests, I really wanted to write up my investing thesis. But got carried away at the start of this post, and anyway, I’ve come to realize that I don’t really need to impress on anybody why BYND is a bubble.

Everybody seems to know it!

There are already tons of esteemed authors writing about BYND and how it’s way overvalued. Check these out. I’ve read and re-read all of these, but some are now locked up so you can only see the titles, and some snippets. (The comments are fun to read though, and some of these guys are really witty!)

https://seekingalpha.com/article/4288925-beyond-meat-expensive

882) BYND 1.jpg

https://seekingalpha.com/article/4283932-beyond-meat-dramatically-overvalued

884) BYND 2.jpg

https://seekingalpha.com/article/4283512-opinion-beyond-meat-tilray-tale-2-bubbles

885) BYND 3.jpg

https://seekingalpha.com/article/4282108-targeting-36-percent-return-betting-beyond-meat

886) bynd 4

https://seekingalpha.com/article/4275006-beyond-meat-reductio-ad-absurdum-valuation

887) BYND 5

AND MANY MORE…

At this stage, finding an article that’s actually positive about BYND, is like finding a pink diamond.

It seems like the WHOLE PLANET is negative towards BYND, yet the share price just keeps grinding upwards crazily, and despite coming down recently of late, still stays stubbornly high.

As I type this, the share price of BYND is USD 154.77.

I remembered punching in some numbers, scratching my head, and muttering that the world has gone crazy, that the numbers absolutely don’t make any sense………….. when the share price was at USD 100+.

This is as bubblish as my kids’ bath tub when they are left to their own devices.

I won’t illustrate why I think BYND is disgustingly over valued, even now. No investing thesis here. Cos everybody already knows the conclusion, why would I waste my time to illustrate it?

It has come down from the ridiculously high USD 220+, but it’s still dumb nevertheless.

Everybody knows it’s mad to do so, so who exactly is buying? If nobody’s buying, what’s keeping the share price elevated?

The answer lies in the low liquidty and float.

For the record, I agree with ALL the esteemed writers, talking about how BYND is an obvious short. Sure.

But because of the low float, the share price is kept high via a series of repeated short squeezes.

Borrowing costs for BYND is as crazy as it’s valuation:

888) BYND borrowing costs

And this is already a much better situation for borrowers. About a month or so ago, you couldn’t borrow any BYND shares to short AT ANY COST.

Zero.

The shares were the MOST EXPENSIVE to borrow in the entire US, across all exchanges.

This makes shorting BYND an extremely risky endeavor and 1 whereby the risk-benefit ratio is highly stacked against the shortists.

Upon every 1 tiny bit of positive news, the share price rockets up, and the sudden jump in the share price forces shortists to cover at an increasing price. The rush of buyers to cover at the elevated price, further causes the share price to spike up, and that brings in a new bunch of poor shortists who were forced to cover.

Now, I say they were FORCED to cover, cos it’s exactly that. They really were forced to.

For some, it’s simply cos they shorted on margin, and were squeezed out. For others, it’s cos the losses hit their risk limits, and they had to cut loss and cover their shorts.

But even if you weren’t in either scenario, even if you had all the capital in the world to back your short positions, even if you decided to stare down the world and short BYND till it’s grave… you couldn’t.

The lack of shares for borrowing means that you’d be forced to cover, regardless!

And that’s the sole reason for the bubble inflating and inflating and inflating.

Anyone talking about “business fundamentals”, or “revenue growth”, or “growth in market share” or “proprietary intellectual property” or whatever, is being naive..

It’s pure emotions, and a unique set of conditions resulting in a bubble that’s unseen for a long while.

Despite agreeing with all the short articles above, and the many more that I didn’t paste here, I gotta say that most, if not all, have been unprofitable. Most of those folks have lost money for the reason that I’ve described.

Having shorted earlier (and covered quickly), I was 1 of those folks above. The logical bunch. The rationale, data driven,  intellectuals. The smart money, so to speak.

Yet, my BYND shorts were overall, loss making. (Note the past tense! :) )

Not anymore.

The tide has turned, and nett nett, my overall BYND shorts have finally, turned a profit.

Much of it is due to pure dumb luck, having shorted by selling naked calls at somewhere near it’s peak:

889) BYND short est.jpg

Implied volatility then was something like 90%, and the premiums were absolutely crazy to reflect the uncertainty just prior to ER.

On a side note, I’ve also made a ton coincidentally.

BYND announced a tie up with APRN, and that resulted in a single day jump in APRN’s shares of something like 15%.

I thought it was absolutely ridiculous and shorted APRN as a result, expecting to hold that for a couple of months until the fad dies off and/or the underwhelming numbers come in.

It took a couple of days instead. Literally a couple.

2 days:

890) APRN.jpg


So what’s next?

I’m still not borrowing any BYND shares to short. Borrowing costs are still crazy, and it just doesn’t make any sense to try to swim against the tide.

Even if one has high conviction that you’d beat the tide… we gotta rem that we have to swim against the tide… and STILL swim faster than our dear benchmark S&P. And as I’ve illustrated earlier, S&P is a damn fast swimmer!

In short, there’re just better and easier ways to make some money huh.

I’m currently short BYND, having sold a bunch of calls. All of the calls are expiring in 2 weeks, and I really don’t envision any of them getting exercised. If they are, I’d be covering them on the same day. No taking on a direct short position overnight….

until the lock up expiry.

You see, as part of BYND’s IPO, the insiders and major shareholders have their shares locked up for 6 months.

Supposedly anyway. BYND management and insiders “unlocked” this lock up and sold a bunch of shares themselves recently in a secondary offering. That’s something I’ve never seen personally, but anyway, that’s another story altogether.

The point here is, the insiders deem fit to take profit and let go of a chunk of their own shares at USD 160. I’m not sure why ANYONE would think it wise to buy shares above USD 160. Or even anywhere near there.

You’d have to be a super genius, or super idiot, to believe that you can value it more accurately than the founder and CEO and entire management team.

Anyhow, come the end of Oct, the lock up expires and I just don’t see how the major shareholders wouldn’t be keen and itching to sell out at least a portion, to lock in their profits at the current valuation.

Right now, they’re probably like race horses at the start of the race, just waiting for the race doors to open.

When that happens, liquidity would be restored, and the market can finally function normally again. Shortists would not be unfairly squeezed out, and the weighing machine can begin to weigh BYND for what it’s truly worth.

Until then, my plan is mainly to sell naked calls as and when, the premiums make it worthwhile. But because it’s impossible to hold a direct short position, or rather, there’s no way I want to be caught in that situation, so the only naked calls I’d be selling are far OTM ones.

I think the climate and opinion has changed with the secondary offering. Sure, you’d still get some resilience cos the float is still pretty low… but the number of dumb buyers just hoping on the train hoping for a quick buck, has pretty much thinned out.

Once liquidity is restored, we’d see who has the last laugh.

After October though, I might look to start piling into the puts, provided I get a good price for them. I don’t think it’d take too long for this to play out: I’m pretty sure the large institutional SHs are also pretty keen and raring to get some shares liquidated, having seen the insiders and management team sell some of theirs themselves. So I don’t think it’s necessary to get the LEAPS.


I like this pic.

It’s basically a summary of everything I wrote above:

891) Wrong Buzzlightyear

Wrong. Buzz Lightyear.