This is a continuation of:
Centurion Corporation Investing Thesis Part I
Centurion Corporation Investing Thesis Part II
In the comments section of part II, a reader commented that he isn’t so sure about Centurion, and if anything, it’ll be a small punt rather than a core position in a portfolio. That, in a nutshell, describes how I feel too. Currently, at least.
Centurion has several things going for it, but as I described in part II, the debt is certainly a concern. Furthermore, as I judge that Centurion doesn’t have a moat around it’s business, it’s therefore difficult to project with certainty, the currently good CFs.
In the dormitory business, it is very difficult to get an enduring moat around your business as the main criterion for your clients, is the price they’re paying for their staff’s accommodation. I can see where Centurion’s management is moving with this though; they have tried to build a sense of reliability and efficiency around their business via the “Westlite” brand.
That helps, although I don’t think you’d get much traction in this business. Centurion’s management also has an entrepreneurial bent, they have shown several times that they’re not afraid to be the 1st mover, which can be a good or a bad thing depending on whether they’re right.
They’ve also shown that they have foresight to move into new markets early, without waiting for the business to deteriorate and market forces (aka declining earnings and/or a share price) to force their hand.
Overall, I think Centurion’s management deserves high marks for how the business is being run currently, despite my earlier comments about the debt levels.
So what’s in store for Centurion going forward?
My guess is that for FY16, the company’s earnings will not be very different from that of FY15. Probably just slightly below that of FY15.
On one hand, the company will be recognizing a one off write down of it’s dorm at Toh Guan from the URA’s decision. So that’s going to be negative for earnings.
On the other hand, FY15 had an extraordinary write down of $4.8mil from the carrying value of their dorm with Lian Beng (Lian Beng-Centurion (Mandai) Pte Ltd), which would not be present for FY16. I guess the abscence of a comparative negative makes a positive.
Dorm rates on a per bed basis has dropped from FY16 compared to FY15, but the company has had new revenue streams from their acquisitions in the student accommodation space.
As of 9M16, the earnings are just slightly lower than 9M15.
So on the balance of everything, there’re some pluses and some minuses, but it’s safe to project a FY16 earnings that’s somewhat similar to FY15, probably slightly lower.
I don’t think the markets are going to be very excited by that. And since in the short term, the share price will basically reflect the market sentiment of all these participants, I don’t think the share price will be very exciting either in the short term.
Oh yes, back to the $4.8mil write down in FY15. Yes, of course I investigated about why there’s this write down. Afterall, it’s very important that we know the reason for it. If it’s recurring, we may end up getting hit by more write downs in future for other dorms!
But I’ve verified with Centurion’s IR who has explained that it’s mainly accounting related.
Basically, the purchase consideration for the joint venture was satisfied by an issue of new shares at 10 cents per share at that time. However, in accounting, the share price, which had risen beyond 10 cents on completion of the acquisition, was used to record as the purchase consideration. As a result of the difference between the share price and issue price of 10 cents, a goodwill of $4.8 million was recorded.
So yes, it’ll likely be extraordinary and not recurring.
Alright. Now I’m really moving on to the specifics. Let me try to project what lies ahead for Centurion.
(The guy standing there way ahead… yea that’s me!)
I deliberately left this part to the last, as it is very technical, and I don’t think anyone reading this without reading all the background given in Parts I and II, would understand what I’m saying.
Now, why am I monitoring Centurion? Thus far, from the facts I’ve put forth in my analysis, it doesn’t look like the company has a lot going for it. It almost looks like something that I should take a quick look at, and chuck it aside for eternity.
The reason why I’m still looking at Centurion in such great detail after 8 months, is because I think that at some point, if the share price continues to decline, Centurion would be one hell of a great investment opportunity.
Well, yes I don’t know exactly when this point will be reached, I don’t think it’s right now though.
Let me substantiate.
I’ve already described how I think the management is pretty good, I’ve also shown how I’m optimistic about the company’s foray into student accommodation. I’ve substantiated my thoughts, and now we’ve seen how GIC is also competing on that front. So we shan’t talk about that again.
In FY15, Centurion explored hiving off it’s dormitory assets into a REIT listing. Now, this is novel for sure, there are no REITs, and there never was ever any REIT, that holds PBWA assets. That’d really be a first of it’s kind.
See what I mean about the management being entrepreneurial?
Unfortunately, after consultation with SGX, they realised that they couldn’t as SGX considers it a “chain listing”. What exactly is a chain listing? SGX considers it a chain listing if the business of the hived off REIT, (or any listed entitiy for that matter), is a “significant” portion of the original parent.
Which makes sense actually. Since the dormitory assets are pretty much the bulk of Centurion’s business. It’s now a smaller proportion, but still the main bulk, because of the expanded student accommodation arm.
That’s a real pity for the company, because if they could successfully hive it off into a REIT, it’d be a major game changer for Centurion. It’d be the best thing they did since the RTO.
Why’d I say that?
Well, firstly, as I’ve illustrated, debt is a major concern for Centurion. With 1 move like this, the debt gets completely eradicated.
Tax savings would be another obvious positive. In FY15, $8.27mil of tax was paid, mostly related to the dormitories; in a REIT structure, most of this tax would’ve been saved.
Some of the dormitories have also reached full occupancy, and as such, they’re “fully valued” mostly. Obviously, this would be the best time to monetize the asset, free up CF, and recycle cash into other opportunities. Something that the management has shown that they’re very capable of digging up.
It all makes perfect sense. Centurion has avenue to deploy cash, but has high debt and is constrained (by market demands) by funds. They’re going to find it difficult to balloon their debt much futher from these levels. So if they can monetize mature assets, the timing would be great.
So it’s really too bad that they’re not allowed to. The company has indicated that they’re still keeping these thoughts for possible future listing into a REIT when the dormitory assets are no longer considered “substantial” enough for it to be considered a “chain listing”
Centurion’s IR has confirmed to me that there is no set guidance or percentage figures on revenue or earnings, below which the assets would not be considered as a chain listing. I didn’t really like this; so who decides if it’s a “chain listing”? It’s arbitrary? Some guy at SGX calls it a chain listing or not depending on his mood?
“The SGX definition for ‘Chain Listing’: A subsidiary or parent company of an existing listed issuer will not normally be considered suitable for listing if the assets and operations of the applicant are substantially the same as those of the existing issuer. In arriving at a decision, the Exchange will consider the applicant’s business or commercial reasons for listing. SGX did not disclose the % which they deemed as substantial for issuers to cross.”
I’m not disputing that in this instance, it shouldn’t be allowed. I’m saying that there should be some clear guideline given, a target that the company can hit, something that a deep value investor can use to gauge.
Anyway, as an academic exercise, I proceeded to stress test Centurion’s dorm assets vs other assets in existing REITs, just to simulate a scenario whereby Centurion is eventually allowed to list it’s dorm assets.
What I’m trying to understand is that, if Centurion were to list their assets in a REIT, would there be market demand for it? How attractive would such a REIT be, compared to other REITs?
This is what I came up with:
This means that at current valuations, if Centurion is an actual REIT, it is much more attractive (from a valuation perspective) than other existing REITs.
(well it’s actually become even more attractive cos the share price is lower than the $0.35 when I did this analysis)
The cap rate for Centurion’s dorm assets are calculated by taking the net income from the assets (before tax) divided by the NAV for the assets.
The cap rate, which I believe would be the key metric for most REIT investors, pretty much trashes the competition, and this is derived on the back of lower PEs.
Do note that the dividend yield seems lower, but that’s for Centurion corp as a whole, which is not reflective of how the REIT would look like. Obviously the yields would be much higher after accounting for the tax savings, the savings on interest expenses, and without the need to set aside cash for other business operations.
So there. This basically illustrates why Centurion’s management explored the hiving of their treasured dormitories into a REIT. The assets would likely garner better valuations, and be worth much more in a REIT than in a company structure. All this while recycling Centurion’s cash to higher growth, newer opportunities.
Too bad it can’t be done now. Looking at the market conditions, it sure looks like it can’t be done anytime soon either.
Since I mentioned about the cap rate, let me move on to talk about the cap rate for Centurion’s debt. (Debt is a recurring theme in this investing thesis cos it’s really the elephant in the room)
A bit of accounting 101 here:
Borrowings can be specific or general in nature.
The specific borrowings are done in relation to the acquisition of a qualifying asset, and no other reasons. It is easy to calculate the cap rate in this type of instances, as we just have to capitalize the actual interest costs incurred, less any income etc earned from the borrowing.
The borrowings that are general in nature though, are more difficult to capitalize as we have to determine how much of the loan is used for the specific asset. So for example, a business may take out a $1mil loan, but use only $700k the build the dorm, while the $300k is used for other purposes.
The cap rate would then be calculated as the weighted average of the borrowing costs applicable to general pool.
To find out the specific interest costs, we then have to multiply this cap rate by the portion of the borrowings that relate specifically to the dorm ($700k).
Let me illustrate with an example:
If Centurion borrowed $600k at 5%, and another $400k at 7%,
This $1mil loan is used for general working capital purposes, as well as to build a dorm.
To build the dorm, Centurion used $400k from the 1st loan, and another $200k from the 2nd loan. (Total of $600k)
What is the cap rate?
The cap rate is the weighted average of the borrowing costs…. so it is calculated as such:
[5% x $600,000/($600,000 + $400,000)] + [7% x $400,000/($600,000 + $400,000)]
=3% + 2.8%
The actual borrowing costs is thus calculated as (5.8% x $400,000) + (5.8% x $200,000) = $34,800
Assuming that amount used to build the dorm was used for 1 yr exactly. If it’s more or less, then simply time weight the borrowing costs.
Alright, so why the trouble going through the above accounting 101 lesson above?
Well, because Centurion’s borrowing costs on general financing are capitalised at a decreasing rate over the years.
What can we conclude from this?
This means that the total borrowing costs, as a proportion of the total debt, has been decreasing.
Since the total debt has been increasing, we can then conclude that the more recent debt have lower interest costs compared to the earlier debt. Alternatively, it could also mean that the interest rates applied to the total debt are floating and has been dropping as a whole.
Either way it’s definitely a good thing for the company as it indicates that the interest cost per dollar of debt has dropped.
The quantum of the total interest costs has increased dramatically, but as a function of the total debt, it has actually dropped.
Certainly something important to assess and understand, seeing that debt is the major concern for Centurion currently.
No investing thesis can be complete without some analysis of the future prospects of the company, qualitatively. Particularly so because Centurion’s prospects will be greatly influenced by government policies as well as general economic factors.
Troubles with foreign workers in recent years made the government sit up and look into the living conditions of our foreign workers. A famous instance is the bus driver strike back in 2012:
(Credit to The Guardian)
Since then, there has been rigorous debate on our foreign workers’ living conditions, particularly the dormitory sector. Check out this long discussion by the Workers’ Party in Parliament:
The government has responded by trying to “encourage” employers to house their workers in suitable dormitories. This means clamping down on illegal dormitories that do not meet the regulatory standards.
On top of that, there are now new rules for dorms housing >1,000 beds. My guess is that the government will slowly eliminate the smaller dorms. Why else would there be additional rules for the large dorms, while the smaller dorms <1,000 beds are not limited by these rules?
This is taken from the Foreign Employee Dormitory Act:
So in summary, here’s the government’s plan.
Go for scale for efficiency. Limit the smaller players, but regulate the bigger players. Make sure the living conditions provided by the bigger dormitories are acceptable – good.
But it’s not just the dormitories. As I mentioned in Part I, PBWA covers factory converted quarters as well. These have also come under scrutiny and certain rules have been put in place. Come on, everyone loves free Wi-fi:
On top of all that, foreign workers from certain sectors (that are non-Malaysians) are no longer allowed to be housed in HDB flats:
So where is the industry headed to in the long run?
The smaller dormitory players will find it economically unfeasible to compete. Land sizes set aside for dormitories will be of a certain size to encourage large dormitories of 1,000 beds. Illegal dormitories will be cracked down upon. These regulations would ensure that only competent and efficient operators will survive.
All that is obviously good for Centurion.
But even amongst existing large dormitories and their operators, there’d be more requirements placed on these dormitories. The standard of the living conditions would have to improve over time, and all these would add to the operating costs of the business.
That’s not good for Centurion.
How about the demand for beds?
Here’s some data I’ve compiled:
1. Data may not add up to the total due to rounding.
2. “Other Work Passes” includes Letter of Consent (LOC) and Training Work Permit (TWP). Training Employment Pass (TEP) was included in “Other Work Passes” from March 2014 onwards.
3. In 2014, estimated that 160,000 workers stay in PBWA (dormitories)
4. Assume that half of the WP holders are malaysians who stay in residential apartments or commute daily to Singapore. Of the other half, assume 80% stay in dormitories.
I don’t have the data for 2016, but we can already see stagnation or a slight dip starting in end 2015, I think it’s safe to assume that the demand has continued dipping in 2016.
I think Centurion is one company to watch for the future. Well run, sharp management with a good track record thus far.
Unfortunately, the industry headwinds in the near term are strong, and there’s nothing much they can do about it.
I’ll be monitoring the new growth areas: the student accommodation business here and overseas, to see if the occupancy figures hold up. It’d be difficult for Centurion to do more acquisitions for now, until they can get their debt levels down.
This is a period of consolidation, I’d be hoping the share price continues dropping while I monitor the company. There’d come a time when this becomes a fantastic opportunity to allocate capital.
Lastly, for additional reading on Centurion, I’d just link to one of my fellow bloggers’ (TUB) post here:
Thanks for listing my post here! Surprise me.
But your analysis is way more deeper then what I have gone through.
Nevertheless, its interesting both of us have the same conclusion.
This sounds evil, but lets hope the price shall drop more and more!
I don’t understand the “cap rate for debt”. If its the weighted average interest cost for a project’s borrowings, and they are giving numbers like 0.53% & 0.6%, then someone is lending them money at less than SIBOR! Unless the “weighted average interest cost” includes some funding from their own cash (i.e. at an interest rate of zero)?
Based on 2015 AR numbers, for borrowings as a whole, I don’t think rising rates are an issue:
– I calculate their bank borrowing interest rate at 1.4%. Guessing the loan terms are SIBOR + 0.5%. Slightly less than a HDB loan!
– So if SIBOR had been 3%, interest payments for bank borrowings would have increased from 6m to 15m. Profit Before Tax (and also excluding property revaluations) would dropped 38%. This is an extreme example and they’d still be profitable.
So the biggest unknown is rents. Industries with high fixed costs (operating leverage) may be highly cyclical, as players will run at a loss (or break even cashflow) just to survive. Until the weaker ones exit or demand recovers. So pessimistically, the risk in buying now is that the market is correctly forecasting a bad downturn in this industry. Optimistically, this could be a bet on the recovering O&G and real-estate sectors. Who knows?
“The actual borrowing costs incurred during the period up to the issuance of the temporary occupation permit less
any investment income on temporary investment of these borrowings, are capitalised in the cost of the property
under development. Borrowing costs on general borrowings are capitalised by applying a capitalisation rate to
construction or development expenditures that are financed by general borrowings.”
Yes, their cap rate is very very low. I am guessing it’s because it’s secured. Do note that this cap rate is only for the general financing portion.
You can find out more about this from:
Click to access guide_capitalisation_brwg_costs.pdf
Centurion is a bet on the general infrastructure and economy. For sure, that includes O&G and construction, but it’s probably more than that. For eg. I know that some of the chinese bus drivers are housed in their dormitory. So SMRT is their client.
Hello, I came across your blogpost while doing some research for my school project on the possibility of a dormitory REIT. hope we can connect over email or zoom on your thoughts of a dormitory reit in today’s market (2020).
You can email me at email@example.com